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Despite the prevalence of studies examining economic decision-making as a purely
rational phenomenon, common sense suggests that emotions affect our decision-making
particularly in a social context. To explore the influence of emotions on economic
decision-making, we manipulated opponent-directed emotions prior to engaging
participants in two social exchange decision-making games (the Trust Game and the
Prisoner’s Dilemma). Participants played both games with three different (fictional)
partners and their tendency to defect was measured. Prior to playing each game,
participants exchanged handwritten “essays” with their partners, and subsequently
exchanged evaluations of each essay. The essays and evaluations, read by the participant,
were designed to induce either anger, sympathy, or a neutral emotional response
toward the confederate with whom they would then play the social exchange games.
Galvanic skin conductance level (SCL) showed enhanced physiological arousal during
anger induction compared to both the neutral and sympathy conditions. In both social
exchange games, participants were most likely to defect against their partner after
anger induction and least likely to defect after sympathy induction, with the neutral
condition eliciting intermediate defection rates. This pattern was found to be strongest
in participants exhibiting low cognitive control (as measured by a Go/no-Go task). The
findings indicate that emotions felt toward another individual alter how one chooses to
interact with them, and that this influence depends both on the specific emotion induced
and the cognitive control of the individual.
Keywords: anger, sympathy, decision-making, social exchange, prisoner’s dilemma, trust game, cognitive control,
emotion
INTRODUCTION
Economic theory commonly follows a normative approach to
understanding human decision-making. That is, humans are
assumed to be rational beings, motivated purely by the goal
of maximizing gains and minimizing losses (Camerer, 1997).
Recently, however, economists have taken a more descrip-
tive approach, incorporating psychological findings of the way
humans actually behave into their models. Since humans must
commonly make decisions within a social context, it is important
to explore the factors that influence our social decision-making.
It has been found that social interactions are driven not only by
logic (Camerer, 1997; Burks et al., 2003; DeSteno et al., 2010) but
also by factors such as descriptive framing (Camerer, 1997; De
Martino et al., 2006), fairness equilibrium (Camerer, 1997), con-
sideration of the beliefs and desires of other players (Dubey et al.,
1987; Mellers et al., 2010), perceived trustworthiness (Cox, 2004;
King-Casas et al., 2005; Charness et al., 2011), and other aspects of
the players’ perceived character (De Dreu and McCusker, 1997).
Moreover, social decision-making is influenced by our emotions
(Frank, 1988; Elster, 1999). While normative economic theories
rely on the view that humans are purely rational agents com-
puting the best possible outcome, descriptive economic theories
are beginning to incorporate emotion into their models (Frank,
1988; Loewenstein, 2000; Lerner et al., 2004; Andrade and Ariely,
2009).
The role of emotion in social decision-making can be explored
using social exchange games. The Prisoner’s Dilemma and the
Trust Game are two games which are commonly used to measure
decision-making in which the outcome depends on the interac-
tion between two players. In the Prisoner’s Dilemma [developed
by Flood and Dresher in 1950 (Kuhn, 2009)], each of two play-
ers simultaneously choose to cooperate or to defect against the
other player. If one player cooperates and one defects, then the
defector wins money while the cooperator loses money. If both
players choose to defect, then both will lose money, but the
amount lost is less than if one is the sole defector. The pay-off
matrix is such that the “rational” choice (in a one-shot game) is
to defect; however in a repeated game a better outcome is received
by both players when they both cooperate. In the Trust Game
(Berg et al., 1995), the two players make their decisions sequen-
tially. The first participant must choose either to cooperate and
share an amount of money with the other player (in this case the
amount of money the other player receives is multiplied by a cer-
tain coefficient), or to defect and keep everything for themselves.
If they choose to cooperate, the other player can then either recip-
rocate by returning half of the received money or they can keep
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everything for themselves. The fact that the Prisoner’s Dilemma
involves simultaneous interaction, while the Trust game involves
sequential choices, may result in the two games loading differently
on the decision-makers’ cognitive resources. Specifically, play-
ers of the Prisoners Dilemma must keep in mind four possible
outcomes of the interaction and to anticipate what their oppo-
nent might chose, while players of the Trust Game must consider
only two possible options and have greater influence on the end
result of interaction. Cognitive load is known to influence the
level of cooperation in such socially-interactive decision games.
For example, when participants must memorize 7 digits (high-
cognitive load) instead of 2 digits (low load), they are found to
cooperate more in the Prisoner’s Dilemma, particularly as the end
of the game approaches (Duffy and Smith, 2012).
From studies investigating decision-making in the Prisoner’s
Dilemma and the Trust Game it is evident that people do not
always make the “rational” choice (Dawes and Thaler, 1988). One
possible factor explaining these deviations from rationality is that
emotions influence our decisions in these games (Frank, 1988;
Elster, 1999). As such, participants may be seen to make deci-
sions more so with an aim of regulating their emotional responses
than to maximize monetary reward. Moreover, emotions can also
aid decision-making by providing information relevant for choice
valuation, motivating those behaviors which are most in line with
personal values as well as moral and social norms (Peters et al.,
2006a; Pfister and Böhm, 2008). Emotions can also focus the
decision-maker’s attention onto the most salient (or personally
relevant) aspects of the decision scenario, thus adjusting which
information will be used most for the decision (Pfister and Böhm,
2008).
Another factor influencing what choices individuals make is
cognitive control capacity. In a study by De Neys et al. (2011) per-
formance on the Go/no-Go task was compared between individu-
als who rejected a high number of unfair offers in the Ultimatum
Game with those who rejected a low number of unfair offers. The
results showed that those who rejected a low number of unfair
offers had higher cognitive control than those who rejected a
high number, suggesting that judgments of fairness have a greater
effect on choice behavior when cognitive control is low. Cognitive
control also has influence in logical reasoning, where individuals
with higher cognitive control are found to reason in line with logic
while low cognitive control participants make their choices more
intuitively (Stanovich and West, 2000). In addition to this, an
imaging study with the Ultimatum Game showed that recipients
of unfair offers had a higher activation in brain areas related to
cognitive control (dorsolateral prefrontal cortex) and emotional
processing (anterior insula) (Sanfey et al., 2003) suggesting that
both cognitive control and emotion processing are involved in
making decisions in economic games.
Here we explore the effects of two partner-directed emo-
tions predicted to influence social exchange decision-making—
sympathy and anger. Sympathy is defined as an emotional
response that results from awareness of another person’s unde-
sirable experiences. Its subjective experience consists of feelings
of sorrow and concern for the other, and is also associated with
heightened awareness of the plights of others, and a desire to help
(Eisenberg and Strayer, 1987; Eisenberg, 1991). Many researchers
have considered sympathy and empathy as synonyms (Rosenberg
and Towers, 1986; Eisenberg and Miller, 1987; Eisenberg and
Fabes, 1990; Decety and Chaminade, 2003) and here we also
do not distinguish them. On the other hand, anger is related to
hostility and aggression, and varies in intensity from mild irri-
tation to fury or rage (Spielberger et al., 1983). For sympathy
to be induced, past studies have shown that the subject must
adopt the other’s perspective or to place at least a moderate value
on the welfare of the other (Smith, 1992; Lishner et al., 2011).
For anger to be induced unexpected and apparently real frus-
trating events, with negative impacts on wellbeing, are required
(Stemmler, 1997; Clore and Centerbar, 2004; Lobbestael et al.,
2008; Winterich et al., 2010; Deffenbacher, 2011).
With their differential antecedents, it is unsurprising that
sympathy and anger promote differential behavioral tendencies.
Sympathy has been known to induce helping behavior in students
sharing their lecture notes with another student for whom ill-
ness has prevented them from taking their own notes (Reisenzein,
1986). It also promotes willingness to help a family whose son has
cancer (Harmon-Jones et al., 2003) and to help a multiple scle-
rosis patient even after receiving an insulting comment from him
(Harmon-Jones et al., 2004). Sympathetic concern also encour-
ages higher donations when a victim (a starving child in Africa) is
identifiable (where participants receive a photo and description of
the child), than when the victim is presented as a non-identifiable
single victim or merely as a statistic (Small et al., 2007). It is also
found to encourage more generous decisions toward the other
person in economic decision-making games when the outcome of
interaction depends on two individuals, such as in the Prisoner’s
Dilemma (Batson and Moran, 1999; Batson and Ahmad, 2001;
Duersch and Servatka, 2007) and “Ring Measure of Social Values”
(Van Lange, 2008). In these two games, higher cooperation rates
are promoted when participants perceive their opponent to be in
need and when they adopt their opponent’s feelings (Batson and
Moran, 1999; Van Lange, 2008). In a study by Batson and Moran
(1999), relating to and being aware of a partner’s current diffi-
culties, results in higher cooperation in the Prisoner’s Dilemma,
compared to a control condition. In a follow-up study by Batson
and Ahmad (2001), this increased cooperation was apparent even
when the opponent had made previous decisions in the game that
were against the interests of the participant.
In contrast, anger is found to encourage higher defection rates
in social-exchange games, including the Power-to-Take Game
(Bosman and van Winden, 2002; Ben-Shakhar et al., 2004),
the Prisoner’s Dilemma (Duersch and Servatka, 2007) or the
Ultimatum Game (Sanfey et al., 2003). Using the Power-to-Take
Game, Bosman and van Winden (2002) found that the more
anger participants felt about their opponent’s decision, the more
often they destroyed income even if that was costly to the partici-
pant themselves. Moreover, the intensity of felt anger is found to
be positively related to the defection rate in an economic game
with punishment (De Quervain et al., 2004). In addition, it has
been found that anger, induced through perceptions of charac-
ter, elicits violent behavior toward the anger-inducing individ-
ual (Harmon-Jones and Sigelman, 2001). Similar results emerge
from studies investigating the effect of emotion on negotiation
decisions. In a study by Van Kleef et al. (2004), participants acted
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as a phone seller and were asked to negotiate with a potential
buyer about price, warranty, duration of the service contract etc.,
Van Kleef et al. found that, when facing angry buyers, partici-
pants made lower demands (offered lower price, longer warranty,
etc.) and more often accepted bigger concessions requested by the
buyer (Van Kleef et al., 2004). On the other hand, when indi-
viduals received information about the buyers’ own emotional
responses to either the offers or to the individuals themselves
(e.g., “this [offer/person] makes me really angry”), anger directed
toward their behavior was found to have different effects com-
pared to emotions directed toward the person. Specifically, anger
induced by the individual’s previous offers resulted in larger
concessions and lower demands compared to behavior-oriented
happiness. Conversely, buyers who felt person-directed anger (i.e.,
buyers who said “this person makes me really angry”) encour-
aged individuals to make lower concessions and higher demands
in the negotiation process compared to person-directed happi-
ness (Steinel et al., 2008). In a study by Kopelman et al. (2006),
participants made higher demands (when playing the role of
seller), while interacting with buyers displaying negative emo-
tions, offering higher phone price, shorter warranty period, etc.,
and were less likely to sign a deal compared to positive and neu-
tral emotions (Kopelman et al., 2006). These studies not only
show that anger results in reduced cooperation with others com-
pared to other emotions (neutral and happy), but also indicate
that person-directed emotions and behavior-directed emotions
can have different effects on social behavior.
The current study explored how the emotions of sympa-
thy and anger affect decision-making in the Prisoner’s Dilemma
and the Trust Game in a within-subject design. We hypothe-
sized that sympathy and anger would have different effects on
social decision-making, such that sympathy would reduce defec-
tion rates and anger would increase defection rates, compared
to neutral emotion. Given the possibility that the two games
load differently onto cognitive resources, we also explored how
individual differences in cognitive control moderate emotional
influences on decision-making in the Prisoner’s Dilemma and
the Trust Game. We expected participants with lower cognitive
control to have different defection rates than those with higher
cognitive control.
To test the efficacy of our emotional manipulations we used
galvanic skin conductance measures and subjective reports. Skin
conductance is commonly used as an indication of physiologi-
cal and psychological arousal, by observing electrical conductivity
responses in the skin. In accordance with past literature, we
expected to find higher skin conductance levels (SCLs) to be asso-
ciated with anger and sympathy emotion-induction conditions
compared to neutral (Rustichini, 1966; Ben-Shakhar et al., 2004;
Hein et al., 2011). We also collected self-report data and used a
cluster analysis to examine the subjective experience associated
with each emotion induction condition.
METHODS
PARTICIPANTS
Thirty-eight participants took part in the study. All partic-
ipants had normal or corrected-to-normal vision and were
not undergoing any psychopharmacological treatment (one
participant was removed after self-declaring that they had an
anxiety disorder). Another eight participants were removed after
declaring that they were aware of the deception, leaving 29 par-
ticipants for the final analysis (14 females) (mean age = 23
years, SD = 4.4). The study was approved by the Department
of Psychology ethics committee, University of Hull, and was
carried out in accordance with the ethical guidelines published
by the British Psychological Society, the American Psychological
Association and the Declaration of Helsinki.
PROCEDURE
Participants were asked to come to the experiment with an essay
they had written about something that was important to them.
They also believed that three “other participants” had done the
same and would be participating in the experiment at the same
time, though the participant never met these other individuals
and, indeed, they were not real. Participants were told that, for
reasons of anonymity, all participants would complete the exper-
iment in separate rooms. During the experiment participants
would read the other participants’ essays and would evaluate them
one by one (while they believed their own essay was also being
evaluated by each other participant).
Participants always began the experiment by completing the
Go/no-Go task, to measure their cognitive control. Following this,
they were presented with their first opponent’s essay to read and
evaluate. Once this essay was evaluated, participants played two
distractor games while the experimenter left the room (the partic-
ipant believed to collect the opponent’s evaluation). The Wason
Card Selection task (Wason, 1968) and the THOG task (Wason
and Brooks, 1979) were used as distractors in order to make the
aims of the study less obvious to participants. Performance in
these tasks was not analysed further. The participant then received
his opponent’s evaluation of his own essay, and then immediately
played three rounds of the Prisoner’s Dilemma and three of the
Trust Game with this same opponent. This was followed by new
versions of each distractor task.
This procedure of essay reading/evaluation, distractor tasks,
receipt of one’s own evaluation and social-exchange game playing
was then repeated for the remaining two emotion conditions (i.e.,
with the remaining two “other participants”). The order of emo-
tion conditions (sympathy, anger, and neutral) and the order of
the social decision-making tasks were counterbalanced between
subjects to avoid order effects (Figure 1A). At the end of the
experiment, participants completed the emotion questionnaire
(see below). Finally, the experimenter asked questions to deter-
mine whether the participant suspected deceit or the aim of the
experiment. While deception/harm to the participant was transi-
tory, full debriefing, and contact details for a university counselor
were given to participants at the end of the experiment.
STIMULI
Emotional manipulation
The emotion manipulation was achieved by presenting par-
ticipants with pre-constructed essays, which they believed
were written by their partner participants, and with subse-
quent evaluations of the participant’s own essays, which they
believed were also written by their partners. The evaluation
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FIGURE 1 | (A) Experiment timeline for an example participant. The
order of the three emotion induction conditions, and of the two
social-exchange games (the Prisoner’s Dilemma and the Trust
Game), were counterbalanced across participants. (B) Pay-off matrix
for the Prisoner’s Dilemma game. (C) Pay-off matrix for the Trust
Game.
forms consisted of ratings of the essays on six 9-point bipo-
lar scales (unintelligent–intelligent; thought provoking–boring;
friendly–unfriendly; illogical–logical; respectable–unrespectable;
irrational–rational), along with a space for free comments.
Together, the essays and evaluations were designed to induce
sympathy toward one of the partner participants, anger toward
another and neutral emotion toward the third. The emotion in
the sympathy condition was induced through the essay, and in
the anger condition was due to the negative evaluation of the
participant’s own essay. The sympathy-inducing essay was mod-
ified from Harmon-Jones et al.’s (2003) and concerned a young
person coping with cancer. The essay was re-written accord-
ing to UK education and healthcare standards. After reading
this essay, the participant received a neutral evaluation of their
own essay, consisting of neutral ratings (between 4 and 7 on
the evaluation scales) and a hand-written positive comment “I
can understand why a person would think like this.” In the
anger-inducing condition the participant read a poorly writ-
ten essay (grammatical mistakes, badly structured arguments)
and subsequently received a negative evaluation of their own
essay (Harmon-Jones and Sigelman, 2001). The anger-inducing
evaluation consisted of ratings that were weighted toward neg-
ative words (e.g., illogical or unacceptable). An insulting com-
ment was also hand-written underneath the evaluation (“This
is the stupidest thing I have ever read”). In the neutral con-
dition they received an emotionally neutral essay, written in
an unemotional and grammatically correct way, followed by
a neutral evaluation of their own essay (consisting of neutral
evaluations between 4 and 6, and no additional hand-written
comments).
The three essays/evaluations were written in clearly differen-
tiable handwriting, and were piloted before the study to check
that they triggered the targeted emotion (15 participants were
monitored with galvanic skin conductance measurement and
later reported what emotions the essays triggered). Galvanic skin
conductance serves as an objective measure of emotional arousal,
since participants cannot exert top-down control on their skin
conductivity responses (Ben-Shakhar et al., 2004; Lin et al., 2005).
However, we realize that a drawback of such measures is that they
do not allow us to address the subjective content and direction of
the emotional experience which is why we also included a self-
report emotion questionnaire which participants completed at
the end of the experiment.
Self-report emotion questionnaire. Here participants were pre-
sented with a list of 36 emotion words and, for each word, indi-
cated which (if any) “other participant” they had felt it toward.
The questionnaire was analysed with a hierarchical and k means
cluster analysis.
Galvanic skin conductance. Galvanic skin conductance was con-
tinuously recorded through the experiment using a second com-
puter, connected to a Biopack MP100A digital skin conductance
amplifier with a constant voltage of 0.5 V. Electrodes were placed
on the non-dominant hand and attached to the medial phalanx
surfaces of the middle and index finger. An electrodermal gel
(GEL101) was used as an electrolyte for conductance.
Galvanic SCL was calculated individually for each emotion-
induction condition. The skin conductance measurements were
analysed from the time when participants received the essays
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and evaluations (with baselines collected at rest periods before
each of these critical time windows). That is for the sympa-
thy condition, SCL was analysed while participants read the
sympathetic essay and for the anger condition while reading
the negative evaluation on the participant’s own essay. For
the neutral condition, galvanic skin conductance was averaged
from reading the neutral essay and receiving the neutral eval-
uation on the participant’s own essay. The mean SCLs were
computed for each condition, using Acknowledge 3.9.1 for
Windows.
Decision-making tasks
The following tasks were completed by participants separately
for each emotion condition (with three repetitions of each task
per fictional partner). The tasks were presented on a computer,
using Cogent 2000v1.32 (www.vislab.ucl.ac.uk) through Matlab
(version R2011.a). Participants were guided through the rules of
these games, and the experimenter asked questions to make sure
that the participants understood the game. To reduce participant’s
expectations and any reputation effects in the games, participants
were told that they may or may not play some games more than
once.
Prisoner’s Dilemma. The task was developed by Flood and
Dresher in 1950 (Kuhn, 2009). Participants are asked to imag-
ine that they are two criminals who are hiding money. They have
been caught by the police, separated, and each given two options:
betray/defect or keep silent/cooperate. If one cooperates and the
other one defects, the defector is able to keep all the money, while
the cooperating player must pay a fine. If both remain silent, how-
ever, they both get half of the money. If both choose to defect,
they will both have to pay half of the fine. This pay-off matrix is
illustrated in Figure 1B.
Trust Game. In the Trust Game (Berg et al., 1995) participants
can be either player A or player B. Player A has an amount of
money and may decide to either send it to player B or to keep it
all for himself/herself. If the money is sent to player B, the total is
multiplied by four and then player B must choose to either send
half back to player A or keep it all. During this experiment par-
ticipants played both as player A and player B, with the order
counterbalanced across the runs of the game. The pay-off matrix
is given in Figure 1C.
Cognitive control task
Participants also completed a Go/no-Go task to measure cog-
nitive control abilities (see De Neys et al., 2011). This task was
administered once at the start of the experiment (i.e., prior to
any essay reading/evaluation). At trial onset, a central fixation
point was shown for 500 ms followed by a single letter for 500 ms
(the target letter was either “W” or “M,” counterbalanced across
participants) with an intertrial interval of 1 s. Participants were
instructed to respond as fast and as accurately as possible with a
keypress whenever the target letter was present. A warning mes-
sage appeared if they took longer than 500 ms or the response was
incorrect. In total 100 trials were presented with 80% of the trials
showing the target.
ANALYSIS
The key-dependent measures in this study were defection rates
in the Prisoner’s Dilemma and the Trust Game (for each game,
participants could defect a total of 0, 1, 2, or 3 times per emotion-
induction condition). These dependent measures are ordinal, and
Kolomogorov–Smirnov and Shapiro–Wilk tests showed that the
data were not normally distributed. As a result, we used non-
parametric statistical tests (as has been done previously, Brosig,
2002; Falk et al., 2005). The data were analysed with a two-way
mixed non-parametric design (2 cognitive control groups × 3
emotion conditions) with defection rate as the dependent vari-
able (Field et al., 2012). This analysis was performed separately for
the Prisoner’s Dilemma and the Trust Game and post-hoc com-
parisons were carried out using Bonferroni corrected Wilcoxon
Signed-Rank tests (two-tailed, alpha = 0.017) to explore any
differences further.
The number of errors in the Go/no-Go task was used
to calculate d′ for each participant as a measure of cogni-
tive control ability. Using a median split, participants were
divided into two groups according to this measure; a low
(d′ = 2.21–3.08, N = 14) and a high cognitive control group
(d′ = 3.24–8.60, N = 15). Planned Mann–Whitney U tests were
then used to analyse whether the effect of emotion on social-
exchange decision-making depended on between-subject differ-
ences in cognitive control, as measured by the Go/no-Go task.
Within each cognitive control group, a Wilcoxon Signed-Rank
test for two related samples was used to test for within-subject
differences between the effects of emotion-induction condi-
tion on defection rates (Bonferroni corrected alpha = 0.017,
two-tailed).
Individual SCL scores were z-transformed for subsequent
analyses with a mixed design ANOVA comparing the three emo-
tion induction conditions (within-subject) and cognitive control
(between-subject). Post-hoc comparisons were performed using
paired t-tests with Bonferroni corrected alpha (two-tailed, p =
0.017).
RESULTS
EMOTIONAL MANIPULATION
Galvanic skin conductance
A significant main effect of emotion condition on z-scored
galvanic SCL (zSCL) was found [f(2, 50) = 6.13, p = 0.004].
However, there was no main effect of cognitive control and there
was no emotion condition × cognitive control group interaction
(p > 0.05). Post-hoc analyses with paired t-test revealed that zSCL
during the sympathy condition did not differ significantly from
the neutral condition (p > 0.05). However, in the anger condi-
tion zSCL was significantly higher compared to the sympathy
condition and to the neutral condition [t(28) = 2.63, p = 0.014,
and t(28) = 4.12, p ≤ 0.001, respectively, Bonferroni corrected].
These findings show that anger induction, but not sympathy, is
associated with a higher zSCL compared to the neutral emotional
induction (Figure 2).
In order to evaluate whether zSCL was related to the effect of
cognitive control on defection rate, Spearman’s correlation anal-
yses were performed separately for low and high cognitive con-
trol individuals. There were no significant correlations between
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defection rate and zSCL neither in high nor low cognitive control
participants (p > 0.05).
Self-report questionnaire
We used a hierarchical cluster analysis procedure to determine
the number of clusters that could be extracted from participants’
responses on the self-report emotion questionnaire. This analy-
sis was based on the Squared-Euclidian distance following Ward’s
method (Willebrand et al., 2002; Bigne and Andreu, 2004) and
determined the number of clusters according to an agglomeration
schedule as suggested by Burns and Burns (2008). We selected a
three cluster solution, on the basis that adding further clusters
FIGURE 2 | Z-scores of mean skin conductance level (zSCL) as a
function of emotion-induction. The mean zSCL during anger-induction
was significantly higher than that of the neutral induction (p = 0.005) and
sympathy induction (p = 0.029). Sympathy SCL was not significantly higher
than that of the neutral condition (p > 0.05). The asterisks highlight
significant paired comparisons after Bonferroni correction (p ≤ 0.017). Error
bars represent ±1 SEM.
had minimal additional effect on the agglomeration coefficient.
Accordingly, a three cluster analysis was then performed using
a k means approach, which grouped all 36 self-report emotion
questionnaire items according to their similarity across partici-
pant ratings (Bigne and Andreu, 2004). The words found to be
associated with each cluster are presented in Figure 3A, along
with each cluster’s Cronbach’s alpha. Figure 3B illustrates these
clusters according to the number of participants reporting words
specific to each cluster in each emotion condition. T-tests showed
that words from cluster 1 were more often reported to be expe-
rienced during the neutral condition than the anger [t(11) =
7.18, p = 0.015, Bonferroni corrected] or sympathy conditions
[t(11) = 2.89, p ≤ 0.001]. In contrast, words from cluster 2 were
more often experienced during the anger condition, compared
to the sympathy and neutral condition [t(14) = 4.38, p = 0.001
vs. t(14) = 6.94, p ≤ 0.001]. Cluster 3 words were more often
reported in the sympathy condition than in the anger [t(8) = 3.07,
p = 0.015, Bonferroni corrected] or neutral condition [t(8) =
4.06, p = 0.004].
SOCIAL EXCHANGE TASKS
The Prisoner’s Dilemma
The 2 (high and low cognitive control) × 3 (anger, sympathy, and
neutral conditions) mixed design non-parametric analysis yielded
a significant main effect of emotion (Q = 0.454, p = 0.002) and
a significant interaction between cognitive control and emotion
(q = 5.06, p = 0.01). The main effect of cognitive control was
not significant (p > 0.05). Post-hoc Wilcoxon Signed-Rank tests
showed a significantly higher defection rate after anger induc-
tion compared to sympathy induction (Z = −3.21, p = 0.001,
Bonferroni corrected). While there was no significant differ-
ence between the defection rates following neutral and sympathy
FIGURE 3 | (A) The table shows all 36 words from the self-report emotion
questionnaire grouped into three different clusters identified by the results of
the cluster analysis, along with each cluster’s associated Cronbach’s alpha.
(B) For each cluster of words (as identified by the cluster analysis), the figure
shows the average number of participants who reported experiencing those
words during the sympathy, anger, and neutral emotion conditions. The
asterisks highlight significant paired comparisons after Bonferroni correction
(p ≤ 0.017). Error bars represent ±1 SEM.
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induction (p > 0.05), the anger induction resulted in higher
defection rates compared to the neutral induction (Z = −2.84,
p = 0.004, Bonferroni corrected) (Figure 4).
To explore the interaction effect further, within-subject com-
parisons with Wilcoxon Signed-Rank tests were then performed
for each cognitive control group separately. Defection rates did
not differ significantly between emotion-induction conditions in
high cognitive control participants (p > 0.05). In contrast, low
cognitive control participants showed a significantly higher defec-
tion rate in the anger condition, compared to both neutral and
sympathy inductions (Z = −2.98, p = 0.003, and Z = −2.90,
p = 0.005, respectively, Bonferroni corrected). The increased
defection rate for the neutral, compared to the sympathy condi-
tion, was not significant (p > 0.05) (Figure 5).
The Trust Game
The same non-parametric mixed design analysis was performed
for the Trust Game. The results showed a significant main
effect of emotion (Q = 9.10, p = 0.001), but no main effect of
FIGURE 4 | Mean percentage defection rates in both the Prisoner’s
Dilemma and the Trust Game depended upon emotion condition. The
asterisks highlight significant paired comparisons after Bonferroni
correction (p ≤ 0.017). Error bars represent ±1 SEM.
FIGURE 5 | In the Prisoner’s Dilemma, the effect of emotion on mean
percentage defection rate depended upon cognitive control group. The
asterisks highlight significant paired comparisons after Bonferroni
correction (p ≤ 0.017). Error bars represent ±1 SEM.
cognitive control and no significant cognitive control × emotion
interaction (p > 0.05). Post-hoc comparisons with Wilcoxon
Signed-Rank tests yielded a significantly higher defection rate
in the neutral condition compared to sympathy induction
(Z = −2.45, p = 0.014, Bonferroni corrected) and a significantly
higher defection rate after anger induction compared to sym-
pathy induction (Z = −3.36, p = 0.001, Bonferroni corrected).
The difference in defection rates between the neutral and anger
conditions was not significant (p > 0.05) (Figure 4).
Additional analyses
Kruskall–Wallis tests for more than 2 independent samples did
not find any influence of emotion-induction order on partici-
pants’ defection rates for either game (p > 0.05). Additionally,
defection rates did not differ depending on the “other partici-
pants” previous choice (defect or cooperate) in either game for
any emotion (Wilcoxon Signed Ranks; p > 0.05).
The asymmetry of the effects of anger and sympathy (com-
pared to neutral) on defection rates were tested using Wilcoxon
Signed-Rank tests. There was no significant interaction effect
of [anger – neutral] vs. [neutral – sympathy] for either game
(p > 0.05). These results suggest that, despite sympathy and
anger exerting opposite effects on decision-making (compared to
neutral), the relative strength of these effects was symmetrical.
Finally, to evaluate whether the Prisoner’s Dilemma and the
Trust Game have different cognitive demands, the overall defec-
tion rates in both games were compared. Although participants
chose defection more often in the Prisoner’s Dilemma than in
the Trust Game, the Wilcoxon Signed Ranks test did not reveal a
significant difference between the cognitive control groups; nei-
ther in overall defection rates nor separately in each emotion
condition (p > 0.05).
DISCUSSION
This study investigated the influence of partner-directed emo-
tions on social decision-making. The experiment compared the
effects of two emotion inductions (anger and sympathy) and
one baseline (neutral) emotional condition, and assessed their
differential impacts on decision-making in two social-exchange
games—the Prisoner’s Dilemma and the Trust Game.
The results of the self-report questionnaire indicated that the
three emotion induction conditions were associated with distinct
affective experiences. The feelings most associated with the anger
induction were all negative and in keeping with common defi-
nitions of anger (see Figure 3). The cluster most associated with
our sympathy induction included a mix of positive and negative
feelings, suggesting that sympathy may be a more complex (or
mixed) emotional experience. Specifically, some of the feelings are
associated with empathic understanding of others (e.g., upset and
also feeling strength in the knowledge that people can cope with
a disease), while others may be more linked to heightened con-
cern for others (e.g., feeling attentive and alert), or with the effect
the other person’s psychological state has on oneself (e.g., feel-
ing inspired and interested). The cluster of feelings most strongly
associated with the neutral condition was positive and relatively
placid, which was also in keeping with our expectations. While
this cluster was significantly more associated with the neutral
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condition than both emotional conditions, the sympathy condi-
tion did also load somewhat onto this cluster (clearly more so
than the anger condition), suggesting that there may be a certain
level of overlap between our neutral and sympathy conditions. It
is worth noting, however, that the neutral condition showed no
closer relationship than the anger condition with the cluster that
was most associated with sympathy (i.e., Cluster 3).
Our skin conductance findings show clearer evidence of over-
lap between the sympathy and neutral conditions, in that our
anger induction was associated with increased SCL, while our
sympathy induction was not. This result is consistent with find-
ings by Frodi and Lamb (1980) (see also Frodi et al., 2006),
who showed that sympathy-oriented emotions had no signifi-
cant impact on physiological responses. On the other hand, threat
related stimuli such as angry faces, spiders, or snakes are detected
faster due to evolutionary reasons (Öhman and Mineka, 2001;
Öhman et al., 2001). This idea has received criticism, however,
by those who suggest that the speeded responses to fearful or
threatening stimuli are due to the relevance of the stimuli to the
individual rather than its negative valence (Sander et al., 2003;
Brosch et al., 2007, 2008, 2010). In the context of this study,
it is possible that participants perceived the anger induction-
condition to be more relevant to their current situation which
resulted in a stronger emotional response and inducing a desire in
participants to do something to change their feelings. In contrast,
induced sympathy may not always promote such strong action
tendencies. Accordingly, anger results in higher arousal, while
sympathy is more neutral in terms of the evoked physiological
response. Another explanation may be that sympathy does have
a physiological impact, but that this was simply not measurable
through SCL in our experiment.
The results of the social-exchange games indicated that,
although the sympathy and neutral conditions did not differ
noticeably in their effects on physiological arousal, both the
anger and the sympathy inductions had significant (and oppos-
ing) effects on participants’ social decision-making. The direction
of this effect was consistent with past findings—sympathy trig-
gered lower defection rates and anger triggered higher defection
rates compared to the neutral condition (Batson and Moran,
1999; Bosman and van Winden, 2002; Ben-Shakhar et al., 2004;
Duersch and Servatka, 2007; Van Lange, 2008). Moreover, the
strengths of these impacts were found to be more or less sym-
metrical compared to the neutral condition, despite only the
anger condition having significant influences on participant’s
physiological arousal.
Though the defection rate tended to show at least some
increase from sympathy to neutral and from neutral to anger
in both games, there were subtle differences between the two
games: in the Prisoner’s Dilemma significant differences were
found between anger and neutral, and in the Trust Game between
sympathy and neutral. Therefore, both games were affected by
the emotion manipulations, but in slightly different ways. One
possible explanation for this pattern of results could be the differ-
ent framing of the choices in the games. The Prisoner’s Dilemma
holds a loss frame, because one possible outcome of the game
is that the participant might lose money. In contrast, the Trust
Game holds a gain frame, since the participant can either gain
money or else they will neither lose nor gain. Framing effects
have yielded conflicting results in different studies. Though there
are a wide range of experiments showing that such framing does
influence individuals’ decisions (De Dreu and McCusker, 1997;
Tversky and Kahneman, 1981; Frank and Claus, 2006) other stud-
ies find that not all people are affected by the framing effect
(Peters et al., 2006b). The results of the current study hint that
framing effects may interact with emotion in social decision
games. In the Prisoner’s Dilemma participants are generally more
driven to avoid loss, and the anger condition may make these
losses more salient and the option to defect even more tempting.
Conversely, the Trust Game rewards cooperation, and this may be
further promoted by sympathy rather than anger. Future studies
could explore these possible effects of framing on the influence of
emotion in social decision-making.
A particularly interesting finding from this study is that the
effect of anger on decision-making in the Prisoner’s Dilemma
depended on cognitive control ability—as determined by perfor-
mance in a Go/no-Go task. The effect of anger was driven almost
exclusively by the low cognitive control group. This is consistent
with De Neys et al. (2011), who found that participants show-
ing high defection rates in the ultimatum game also made more
mistakes in a Go/no-Go task, compared to the low defection rate
participants. Our SCL analysis, however, did not indicate a dif-
ference in the strength of experienced emotions between low and
high cognitive control participants. It is possible that high cogni-
tive control participants were better at focusing on the game itself,
and were therefore less affected by their emotions. Kollock (1998)
as well as Komorita and Parks (1999) note that, in the long-term,
cooperation can bring bigger benefits to the players than defec-
tion, and high cognitive control participants may be more likely
to use this logic while playing the game. On the other hand, low
cognitive control participants may be relying more on intuition
(Stanovich and West, 2000; Sunstein, 2005), and in particular an
“outrage heuristic,” which promotes a desire to punish others as
retribution for their anger (Kahneman and Frederick, 2002).
One strength of the present study lies in its within-subject
design, whereby the influence of both emotions—sympathy and
anger—were measured and compared to a neutral baseline within
the same group of participants. The value of a within-subject
design results particularly in the reduction in variance when com-
paring our emotional manipulations. In between-subject designs,
such comparisons may be confounded by variance due to indi-
vidual differences or context effects, giving us less power to
address the effect of the emotional responses we are interested in.
Moreover, in exploring the effect of our between-subject measure
of cognitive control, a within-subject emotional manipulation
allows us to address not only the role of cognitive control on
the effect of one emotion (e.g., anger) on decision-making, but
importantly to address its role in the change in decision-making
between two emotion conditions. In addition to this, the study
assessed the influence of emotions directed toward the other
player with whom participants were playing, rather than being
purely incidental to the decision-scenario. To our knowledge, this
is the first study that uses a within-subject design for investigating
two different emotions directed toward the other person.
One limitation to the current study may be possible reputa-
tion effects induced through multiple repetitions of the games.
Although game order was counterbalanced, and we did not find
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effects of reputation in the three sequential runs of each game,
future studies might randomize the trials completely, such that
participants play multiple games against the three partners in a
fully interleaved manner. Another limitation may be in the self-
report emotion questionnaire used, where sympathy and anger
conditions had different amounts of words representing the pos-
sible emotions (indeed while the word “anger” was present in
the list, “sympathy” was not). Finally, our data show that anger
and sympathy differ in their experiential complexity and associ-
ated physiological arousal, as well as in their valence. As such, it
is yet unclear precisely which of these components of anger and
sympathy best explain their differential effects on social decision-
making. Future studies could directly compare the motivational
effects of emotions that are of similar levels of experiential com-
plexity but differ in terms of valence and/or arousal, or con-
versely that are of similar valence and arousal but differ in their
complexity.
This study shows the differential effects of sympathy and anger
(directed toward the opponent) on socially-interactive decision-
making. Emotions can be beneficial when making decisions—
especially when people do not have time to consider all the
possible choice options and their possible outcomes carefully.
Specifically, emotions can help us to solve a problem more effi-
ciently, and in better accordance with our personal goals and
moral and social norms, than can decision-making in the absence
of emotional influence (Peters et al., 2006a; Pfister and Böhm,
2008). Indeed, the results of this study show that sympathy and
anger, directed toward ones opponent, can have emotion-specific
influences on our social interaction, further reflecting the goal-
directed nature of emotion influences on decision-making. If
a person feels angry, and is motivated to use this emotion in
the decision process, their tendency to defect increases. In con-
trast, if they are motivated to help their partner (as is typical
of sympathy) then their level of co-operation will increase. In
our Prisoner’s Dilemma game, healthy individuals with higher
cognitive control tended to rely less on their anger felt toward
others in their decision-making, while individuals with lower cog-
nitive control tended to be more heavily influenced by feelings
of anger and chose to defect more often, perhaps as punish-
ment or to express their anger. These findings provide support
for complex, and likely bidirectional, interactions between emo-
tion and cognition in decision-making. Heuristic-based thinking
styles have also been suggested to account for judgments and
decisions made in many moral and social contexts (Sunstein,
2005) such as in the Trolley Dilemma, emission trading or
Asian Disease problem. Moreover, emotion-based heuristics (or
“affect heuristics”) have been proposed to provoke judgments
and decisions that are heavily biased by our emotional responses
without the involvement of significant cognitive deliberation
(Slovic et al., 2007). In accordance with such accounts, feel-
ings of anger would be expected to provoke behaviors that can
express this anger and seek retribution (as can be done through
defecting). On the other hand, sympathy promotes a desire to
help the person in need, and this motivation leads to enhanced
co-operation. In keeping with accounts that emotions can bias
judgment and decision-making through a heuristic route, our
findings suggest that people who are more likely to utilize heuris-
tic processing styles (as in the case of our low cognitive control
participants) will be more heavily influenced by their emotional
responses.
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